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One salient problem in Europe results from the different 
approaches, in France and in England particularly, regarding the 
possibility to extend the arbitration clause to non-signatories in 
specific circumstances. It results from various judgments of the 
Court of Appeal of Paris and the Cour de Cassation that a non-
signatory who has been directly involved in the negotiation and/or 
performance and/or termination of a contract containing an 
arbitration clause becomes ipso facto a party to the arbitration clause. 
The formulation of the rule varies slightly from one judgment to the 
other. Initially there was a certain insistence on the fact that when the 
non-signatory had participated in — generally — the performance of 
the contract, and had been aware of the existence of the clause, it was 
to be presumed that it had accepted to be bound by the clause. The 
Court of Appeal of Paris held in several judgments that: 
[a]n arbitration clause inserted in an international contract has a distinct 
validity and force, which requires it to be applied to the parties directly 
involved in the performance of the contract and in the disputes which may 
result from it, once it has been established that they were aware of the 
existence and the scope of the arbitration clause, even though they were 
not signatories to the contract which contained it.1 
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 1. See, eg Société Korsnas Marma v. Société Durand-Auzias, CA Paris, Nov. 
30, 1988 and Société Ofer Brothers v. The Tokyo Marine and Fire Insurance Co 
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I would call this the subjectivist trend. 
But more recently a more objectivist trend has surfaced. For 
instance, in a decision of 2007,2 the Cour de cassation briefly stated 
that “[t]he effect of international arbitration clauses extends to the 
parties directly involved in the performance of the contract and any 
disputes that may arise in connection therewith.”3  
This is a slightly abbreviated restatement of the reasoning of the 
Paris Court of Appeal mentioned above. The Cour de cassation 
eliminated any reference to a supposed intent.  
English courts have adopted a much more classical position: for a 
non-signatory to be bound by an arbitration clause, there must be 
positive acts that clearly establish the non-signatory’s intent to 
accede to the contract, and also the original parties’ acceptance of 
that accession. What is more surprising, and is obviously 
troublesome, is the fact that in a given case a French court on the one 
side, and three English courts on the other side, all purporting to 
apply French law, have come to diametrically opposite results. That 
case, which is recent and already famous, is the Dallah case. 
In the Dallah case, a contract had been concluded between a Saudi 
company, Dallah Estate, and a Pakistani trust called Awami Hajj 
Trust, whereby Dallah agreed to build accommodations suitable for 
pilgrims travelling from Pakistan to Mecca. The negotiations had been 
led, on the side of Pakistan, by the Government, which ultimately 
decided to promulgate an ordinance providing for the establishment of 
the Trust, which would act as a vehicle to undertake the project. A few 
months after the execution of the contract by Dallah and the Trust, the 
Secretary of the Ministry of Religious Affairs, by a letter on the 
Ministry’s headed paper, put an end to the contract, alleging that 
 
Ltd et autres, CA Paris, Feb. 14, 1989, REV. ARB. p. 691 (1989), comment 
Tschanz; Société V 2000 v. Société Project XJ 220 ITD et autre, CA Paris, Dec. 7, 
1994, RTD Com. p. 401 (1995), comment E. Loquin; REV. ARB. p. 245 (1996), 
comment Ch. Jarrosson; Dec. 17, 1997, RTD Com. p. 580 (1998), comment E. 
Loquin; see also SMABTP et autre v. Société Statinor et autres, CA Paris, Mar. 22, 
1995, REV. ARB. p. 550 (1997). 
 2. Société Alcatel Business Systems (ABS), Société Alcatel Micro Electronics 
(AME) et Société AGF v. Amkor Technology et al. Cass 1e civ., Mar. 27, 2007, 
JCP [2007] I 168, No. 11, comment Christophe Seraglini; JCP [2007] II 10118, 
comment Catherine Golhen. 
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Dallah had breached certain fundamental obligations. Dallah started an 
ICC arbitration in Paris against the Government of Pakistan. 
The Government rejected any suggestion that it was a party to the 
contract or that it had consented to the arbitration agreement, and 
denied the arbitral tribunal’s jurisdiction on those bases. The tribunal 
decided that the question whether the Government of Pakistan was a 
party was to be determined “by reference to those transnational 
general principles and usages which reflect the fundamental 
requirements of justice in international trade and the concept of good 
faith in business.”4 More concretely, the tribunal observed that the 
arbitration agreement extended “to parties that did not actually sign 
the contract but were directly involved in the negotiation and 
performance of such contract . . . .” This last formula is a quotation 
from French case law as it was formulated at the time. The arbitral 
tribunal concluded that Dallah had demonstrated that the government 
of Pakistan had been, and considered itself to be, a party to the 
contract with Dallah. On the merits, the tribunal found that the 
government owed Dallah GBP 20 million in damages. 
The claimant made an ex parte application to the Commercial Court 
for leave to enforce the award as a judgment of the High Court of 
England.5 An order giving Dallah such leave was issued, which led in 
turn to an application by the Government to set aside the order on the 
ground that the arbitration agreement on which the award was based 
was not valid within the meaning of Section 103(2)(b) of the English 
Arbitration Act, which reflects Article V.1.a of the New York 
Convention. Article V.1.a provides, in so far as is material to this 
decision, as follows: 
Recognition and enforcement of the award may be refused, at the request 
of the party against whom it is invoked, only if that party furnishes to the 
competent authority where the recognition and enforcement is sought, 
proof that: 
. . . the agreement referred to in article II . . . is not valid under the law to 
 
 4. Dallah Real Estate & Tourism Holding Company v. Ministry of Religious 
Affairs, Government of Pakistan, [2008] EWHC 1901 (Comm), [2008] App.L.R. 
08/01 (1 August 2008), at ¶ 49 [hereinafter Dallah, High Court, [2008] EWHC 
1901 (Comm)]. 
 5. Id. ¶ 54. 
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which the parties have subjected it or, failing any indication thereon, 
under the law of the country where the award was made. 
Since the parties had not agreed on the law by which the arbitration 
agreement should be governed, the High Court and, on appeal, the 
Court of Appeal, found that it was subject to French law, as the law of 
the country where the award was made.6 One could therefore hope that 
a convergence might be reached between the position that a French 
court would adopt, if seized of a request to set aside the award, and the 
position of the English court. What remained to be seen, however, was 
how the English courts would apply the principles of French law. 
What the High Court and the Court of Appeal each understood in 
the application of French law is that: 
in order to determine whether an arbitration clause upon which the 
jurisdiction of an arbitral tribunal is founded extends to a person who is 
neither a named party nor a signatory to the underlying agreement 
containing that clause, it is necessary to find out whether all the parties to 
the arbitration proceedings, including that person, had the common 
intention (whether expressed or implied) to be bound by said agreement 
and, as a result, by the arbitration clause . . . . To this effect, the courts 
will consider the involvement and behaviour of all the parties during the 
negotiation, performance and, if applicable, termination of the underlying 
agreement.7 
The High Court therefore established that it would seek to 
ascertain the subjective intention of each of the parties through their 
objective conduct.8 In doing so, it found that it was not the subjective 
intention of all the parties that the Government of Pakistan should be 
bound by the agreement or the arbitration clause: 
In fact, I am clear that the opposite was the case from the beginning to 
end. That is why the GoP distanced itself from the contractual 
arrangements in the Agreement and that is why it sought to argue from the 
 
 6. Dallah, High Court, [2008] EWHC 1901 (Comm), at para. 3. 
 7. Id., at ¶ 85 (referencing the Joint Memorandum submitted by the parties to 
the High Court encapsulating the principles of French law which the parties agreed 
were applicable to the case). See also Dallah, Court of Appeal, [2009] EWCA Civ. 
755, at para. 26. 
 8. Dallah, High Court, [2008] EWCH 1901 (Comm), at ¶ 87. See also Dallah, 
Court of Appeal, [2009] EWCA Civ. 755, at ¶ 27. 
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time of the Termination Letter that the Agreement was void and illegal.9 
Similarly, the Court of Appeal found that this subjective intention 
— or implicit intention — was lacking. According to Lord Justice 
Moore-Bick, who wrote the lead opinion, there was no doubt that prior 
to the establishment of the Trust, the Government of Pakistan was the 
only party with which Dallah could negotiate. There was, however, a 
fundamental change in that position when the Government established 
the Trust and, most importantly, when the final contract was signed 
only between Dallah and the Trust. Lord Justice Moore-Bick therefore 
posited, in the most commonsensical fashion, that “[i]f it had been [the 
parties’] common intention, the Government would surely have been 
named as a party to the Agreement, or would at least have added its 
signature in a way that reflected that fact.”10 As to the termination 
letter sent to Dallah on the Ministry of Religious Affairs’ letterhead, 
the Court of Appeal found it ambiguous as it was sent by the Secretary 
of the Ministry of Religious Affairs, who is evidently a civil servant of 
the State, but was also the chairman of the board of directors of the 
Trust (in spite of the fact that at that point it had already been 
dissolved).11 The Supreme Court, by a decision of 3 November 2010,12 
confirmed the position taken by the High Court and the Court of 
Appeal. As a consequence, the English courts refused to grant Dallah 
leave to enforce the award. 
A few months later, on February 17, 2011,13 the Court of Appeal of 
Paris, seized of an appeal to set aside the award on the ground of lack 
of jurisdiction of the arbitral tribunal over the Government of Pakistan, 
dismissed the appeal (which entails that the award is enforceable in 
France). The main reasons for the judgment of the Court of Appeal are 
the following. First, the negotiations which led to the execution of the 
contract took place exclusively between Dallah and the Ministry of 
Religious Affairs, and not the Trust, until the day preceding the 
 
 9. Dallah, High Court, [2008] EWHC 1901 (Comm), at ¶ 129. 
 10. Dallah, Court of Appeal, [2009] EWCA Civ. 755, at ¶ 32. 
 11.  Id. at ¶ 34. 
 12. Dallah Estate and Tourism Holding Company v. The Ministry of Religious 
Affairs, Government of Pakistan [2010] UKSC 46. 
 13. Paris, pôle 1, ch. 1, 17 February 2011, RG 09/28533, Gouvernement du 
Pakistan, Ministère des Affaires religieuses c/ Dallah Real Estate and Tourism 
Holding Company. 
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execution of the contract. Secondly, the Ministry had sent two letters 
to Dallah during the period of performance of the contract (a fact that 
was mentioned in the judgment of the Supreme Court, only by Lord 
Mance, who found it irrelevant). Thirdly, although the person who had 
signed the letter purporting to terminate the contract on the headed 
paper of the Ministry was also the chairman of the board of the Trust, 
there was no ambiguity about the fact that he had acted in his capacity 
as Secretary of the Ministry, since the Trust had ceased to exist one 
month earlier for lack of a new presidential decree prolonging its 
existence. The Court adds that the creation of the Trust was purely 
formal, and that the Government had behaved as the actual Pakistani 
party during the economic operation, in particular when it notified the 
termination of the contract to Dallah. 
The Dallah case shows that, even though the English courts 
honestly tried to follow the French approach to the problem, such 
approach is so alien to the English way of reasoning that they simply 
could not overcome the fact that, obviously, it had never been the 
intention of the Government of Pakistan to be bound by the contract. 
And they did not refer to the objectivist trend of the French case law, 
the existence of which made it obvious, for a specialist of French 
arbitration law, that the award would not be set aside. 
Is the French position shocking? At first sight it is, since the consent 
of the parties to arbitrate is the cornerstone of arbitration, and the 
Government of Pakistan had made clear its intention not to be a party 
to the contract containing the arbitration clause. However, the refusal 
to recognize the award would have meant a denial of justice, since the 
Trust had disappeared and there was no other defendant against which 
Dallah could have acted than the Government. In addition, it is the 
Government’s inaction that caused the Trust to cease to exist. The 
Government was under a good faith duty to keep the Trust alive. 
Having failed to do so, it is justified that it had to bear the 
consequences. One could object that a lack of good faith does not 
constitute in itself a valid ground to bind a person to a contract to 
which it never consented to be a party. A more specific theory is 
needed. One could suggest the following analysis. By not renewing 
the decree creating the Trust, the Government deprived Dallah of the 
possibility of performing the contract and/or of claiming damages. 
This constituted a tort, for which the Government was liable vis-à-vis 
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Dallah. The only adequate remedy was to decide that the proceedings 
could be brought against it and that it should (as a consequence) be 
exposed to an order for the payment of damages. 
